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We add an independent unfair background risk to higher order risk-
taking models in the current literature and examine its interaction with
the main risk under consideration. Parallel to the well-known concept
of risk vulnerability, which is defined by Gollier and Pratt (Gollier,
C., Pratt, J. W.: Risk vulnerability and the tempering effect of back-
ground risk. Econometrica 64, 1109-1123 (1996)), an agent is said to
have a type of higher order risk vulnerability if adding an independent
unfair background risk to wealth raises his level of this type of higher
order risk-aversion. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for
all types of higher order risk vulnerabilities and explain their behav-
ioral implications. We find that as in the case of risk vulnerability,
all familiar HARA utility functions have all types of higher order risk
vulnerabilities except for a type of third order risk vulnerability cor-
responding to a downside risk aversion measure called the Schwarzian
derivative.
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Recently, there has been an intense interest in the third or higher order risk
attitudes in the literature. For example, we have seen a series of studies on
the intensity of downside risk aversion (hereafter DRA), which lead to the
establishment of five DRA measures.1 Among the five DRA measures, the
most well-known is the prudence measure defined as P (x) = −u′′′(x)/u′′(x),
where u(x) is a Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Kimball (1990)
establishes this concept to explain precautionary savings. Chiu (2000), how-
ever, finds that prudence is linked to downside risk aversion.2 Chiu (2005,
2010) further shows that prudence measures the intensity of preferences over
a set of downside risk increases and explains its link with skewness prefer-
ence.3
Keenan and Snow (2002, 2009, 2012) suggest another DRA measure, the
Schwarzian derivative S(x) = −R′(x)− 0.5R2(x), where R(x) is the Arrow-
Pratt risk aversion measure, and characterize DRA by considering changes in
risk that induce mean-and-variance-preserving downside risk increases in the
utility distribution. A further measure for the intensity of DRA is proposed
by Modica and Scarsini (2005) and Crainich and Eeckhoudt (2008). Both
studies show that D(x) = u′′′(x)/u′(x) is linked to skewness preference.
Liu and Meyer (2012) propose another measure, −R′(x), the negative
slope of the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion measure along a similar line to Chiu
(2005) and Keenan and Snow (2009), while Huang and Stapleton (2014)
establish a fifth measure which is known as cautiousness C(x) = (1/R(x))′
1The concept of downside risk aversion is established by Menezes et al. (1980).
2Jindapon and Neilson (2007) and Keenan and Snow (2010) also explain how prudence
is linked to DRA.
3Liu and Meyer (2012) also contribute to this result.
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in the literature, using a simple portfolio problem with a risk-free bond,
a stock, and an option. Huang (2012) identifies two sets of downside risk
increases over which the intensity of an individual’s preferences is measured
by cautiousness and D(x) respectively. He also explains the link between
these downside risk aversion measures and skewness preference and shows
the effect of downside risk aversion on option prices.
More work has been done on higher order risk attitudes. For exam-
ple, Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) create a general framework based
on the concept of risk apportionment for analyzing higher order risk at-
titudes. Eeckhoudt et al. (2009) extend the above analysis by appor-
tioning risks via stochastic dominance. Denuit and Eeckhoudt (2010a)
generalize Chiu’s (2005) analysis of downside risk aversion to higher or-
der cases and develop the nth order Arrow-Pratt risk aversion measure
(−u(n)(x)/u(n−1)(x)).4 They (2010b) also establish higher order Ross risk
aversion measures (−1)n−1u(n)(x)/u(1)(y) and generalize the local DRA
measure D(x) to higher orders (−1)n−1u(n)(x)/u(1)(x). Jindapon and Neil-
son (2007) use a comparative statics approach to generalize Arrow-Pratt and
Ross risk aversion measures to higher orders, while Liu and Meyer (2013)
use the ratio of utility premiums to establish the (n/m)th order local Arrow-
Pratt risk aversion measure (−1)n−mu(n)(x)/u(m)(x) and Ross risk aversion
measure (−1)n−mu(n)(x)/u(m)(y).
All the third and higher order risk-taking models in the above studies
deal with only one source of risk; however, as is well recognized, in the
real world individuals may face multiple sources of risks. An important
4Denuit and Eeckhoudt (2010a) define the nth order Arrow-Pratt risk aversion measure
as −u(n+1)(x)/un(x).
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example of additional sources of risks is a decision maker’s background risk.5
As is explained by Gollier and Pratt (1996) in their seminal paper on risk
vulnerability, even if risks are independent, they interact with each other,
and “not taking these interactions into account can lead the theoretical
model to dramatically misestimate optimal risk-taking.”
In this paper we address this issue. We add an independent unfair back-
ground risk to the higher order risk-taking models in the current literature
and examine its interaction with the main risk under consideration. Basi-
cally we ask the following question: what is the effect of an unfair back-
ground risk on the intensity of higher order risk attitudes towards another
independent risk?
Gollier and Pratt (1996) argue that “conventional wisdom suggests that
independent risks are substitutes for each other. In particular, adding an
unfair background risk to wealth should increase risk aversion to other inde-
pendent risks.” This is equivalent to the condition that an undesirable risk
is never made desirable by the presence of an independent unfair risk. They
call this risk vulnerability. A similar argument may apply to higher order
risk taking, and analogous to their concept of risk vulnerability, an agent is
said to have a higher order risk vulnerability if adding an independent unfair
background risk to wealth raises his level of a higher order risk aversion. We
characterize this concept and derive necessary and sufficient conditions for
higher order risk vulnerabilities.
Compared with risk vulnerability, higher order risk vulnerabilities are
more complex. For example, in the case of the third order, we have five
5Different background risks discussed in the literature include labor income risk, hous-
ing risk, entrepreneurial risk, etc. See, for example, Campbell (2006) for a brief review of
this literature.
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types of downside risk vulnerabilities (hereafter DRV) corresponding to five
different definitions of DRA measures respectively, while in the case of nth
(n > 3) order, there are (n−1) types of risk vulnerabilities corresponding to
the (n/1)th, (n/2)th, ..., and (n/(n− 1))th order Arrow-Pratt risk aversion
measures respectively. We give a detailed analysis for each type of the third
and higher order risk vulnerabilities.
The concept of higher order risk vulnerability we study in this paper
is related to the concepts of standard prudence, proper prudence, and pre-
cautionary vulnerability, which Lajeri-Chaherli (2004) uses to explain the
effect of background risk on precautionary savings. It is also related to Pratt
and Zeckhauser’s (1987) proper risk aversion, Kimball’s (1993) standard risk
aversion, and Franke et al.’s (2006) multiplicative risk vulnerability, which
all explain the effect of background risk on risk aversion. The paper is
also related to the work of Hara et al. (2011) who investigate the effect of
background risk on cautiousness. Other related studies include Tsetlin and
Winkler (2005) and Li (2011) who investigate the effect of background risk
on risky choices and demand for risky assets, respectively.
The structure of the remaining paper is as follows. In Section 2, we
characterize downside risk vulnerability. In Section 3, we characterize higher
order risk vulnerability. In Section 4, we discuss an application of the results.
The last section concludes the paper.
2 Downside Risk Vulnerability
We first consider the case of third order risk vulnerability or DRV. As we
pointed out in the Introduction section, there are five types of DRV corre-
sponding to five different DRA measures respectively. We will examine each
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type of DRV.
In this section, we assume that all utility functions are strictly increasing,
strictly concave, and thrice continuously differentiable with a positive third
derivative unless stated otherwise. Given a von Neumann-Morgenstern util-
ity function u(x), as was explained in the Introduction section, we have the
following five alternative DRA measures: P (x) = −u
′′′(x)
u′′(x) (Kimball (1990)





2(x) (Keenan and Snow (2002, 2009,
2012)), −R′(x) (Liu and Meyer (2012)),D(x) = u
′′′(x)
u′(x) (Modica and Scarsini
(2005) and Crainich and Eeckhoudt (2008)), and C(x) = ( 1R(x))
′ (Huang
and Stapleton (2014)), where R(x) is the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aver-
sion. For convenience, sometimes we denote the five DRA measures by
τ1(x) = C(x), τ2 = D(x), τ3(x) = P (x), τ4(x) = −R
′(x), and τ5(x) = S(x),
respectively. Detailed explanations of these five DRA measures are given in
the studies specified above, and a comparison of these five DRA measures
and a discussion of their relationships can be found in Huang (2012).
Now consider the situation where there is an independent background
risk ˜ to the wealth of an agent u(x). Denote his derived utility function by
uˆ(x), i.e., uˆ(x) = Eu(x+ ˜). We now give the formal definition of DRV:
Definition 1 An agent u(x) is said to have DRV of the ith type if τi(x) is
increased by any independent unfair background risk, i = 1, ..., 5.
According to this definition, there are five types of DRV corresponding to
the five DRA measures respectively. We will explain behavioral implications
of these five types of DRV later in Subsection 2.5.
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2.1 A Necessary and Sufficient Condition
In this section we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for each type
of DRV. When there is background risk ˜ to the wealth of an agent u(x), we
denote the type i DRA measure of his derived utility function uˆ(x) by τˆi(x),
i.e., τˆ1(x) = Cˆ(x) = (
1
Rˆ(x)
)′, τˆ2(x) = Dˆ(x) =
Eu′′′(x+˜)
Eu′(x+˜) , τˆ3(x) = Pˆ (x) =
−Eu
′′′(x+˜)
Eu′′(x+˜) , τˆ4(x) = −Rˆ








Eu′(x+˜) . We present the following result.
Theorem 1 An agent u(x) has type i DRV to zero-mean [unfair] back-
ground risks if and only if τi(x) is increased by all independent binary zero-
mean background risks, i.e., the ith of the following five inequalities is true,




≥ C(w)ψ2(w, x, y), ∀ x > 0, y > 0, w, (1)
u′(y)(D(y)−D(x)) ≥ u′(x)D′(x)(y − x), ∀ x, y, (2)








− 0.5ψ2(w, x, y)≥ S(w), ∀ x > 0, y > 0, w, (5)
where ψ(w, x, y) =
xu′′(w−y)+yu′′ (w+x)
xu′(w−y)+yu′ (w+x) .
Proof: See Appendix A.
The above result presents a necessary and sufficient condition for each
type of DRV. We may note that the conditions for type 2 and type 3 DRVs
are bivariate while those for type 1, type 4, and type 5 DRVs are trivariate.
In the latter three cases, for technical reasons we cannot reduce the trivariate
conditions to bivariate forms as we have done for the other two cases;6
6The main technical reason is that in the cases of type 2 and type 3 DRVs, τi(x) is
a ratio of two linear functions of the derivatives of a utility function, thus characterizing
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however, we will be able to derive bivariate sufficient conditions for these
three cases later in Theorem 3, which are close in spirit to the above bivariate
conditions for the other two cases.
2.2 Univariate Necessary Conditions
In the last subsection, we have derived a necessary and sufficient condition
for each of the five types of DRV; however, these conditions are inconvenient
as they are multivariate. In this subsection we search for univariate neces-
sary conditions for the five types of DRV using the case of small background
risks. We have the following result.
Theorem 2 Assume that u(x) is six times continuously differentiable. τi(x)
is increased by all small independent zero-mean [unfair] background risks
only if for all x the ith of the following five inequalities holds [and τi(x) is
monotone decreasing], i = 1, ..., 5.
C′′(x)− 2(1 + 2C(x))C′(x)R(x) + 2C2(x)(1 + C(x))R2(x) ≥ 0, (6)
D′′(x)− 2R(x)D′(x) ≥ 0, (7)
P ′′(x)− 2P (x)P ′(x) ≥ 0, (8)
−R′′′(x) + 2R(x)R′′(x) + 2R′2(x) ≥ 0, (9)
S ′′(x)− 2R(x)S ′(x) + 3(S(x) + 0.5R2(x))2 ≥ 0. (10)
Proof: See Appendix B.
The above result presents a univariate necessary condition for each type
of DRV. The first part (i = 1) of the theorem is derived by Hara et al. (2011)
under the assumption that utility functions are real analytic. We relax this
DRV in these two cases is equivalent to solving a linear-fractional programming problem,
while in the other three cases, it is not.
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assumption to the condition that utility functions are six times continuously
differentiable.
2.3 Univariate Sufficient Conditions
As we pointed out above, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the five
types of DRV presented in Theorem 1 are inconvenient. In this subsection we
derive more convenient sufficient conditions. We first present the following
result.
Theorem 3 Given i ∈ {1, ..., 5}, if for all x and y, hi(y)(τi(y) − τi(x)) ≥
(y − x)hi(x)τ
′
i(x), where h1(x) =
(u′′(x))2
u′(x) , h2(x) = h4(x) = h5(x) = u
′(x),
h3(x) = −u
′′(x), [and τi(x) is monotone decreasing] then, τi(x) is increased
by all independent zero-mean [unfair] background risks, and the converse is
true for i = 2, 3.
Proof: See Appendix C.
The above result gives a more convenient sufficient condition for DRV of
types 1, 4, and 5 than Theorem 1. Nevertheless, the main conditions in the
above theorem are still complicated and inconvenient as they are bivariate,
i.e., they involve computations of functions at two levels of wealth x and y.
Similar to Gollier and Pratt’s characterization of risk vulnerability, in the
remainder of this subsection we derive some univariate conditions. We have
the following result.
Theorem 4 For i = 1, assume C(x) ≥ −0.5. If for all x, τ ′′i (x) ≥
ζi(x)τ
′
i(x), where ζ1(x) = 2P (x) − R(x), ζ2(x) = ζ4(x) = ζ5(x) = R(x),
ζ3(x) = P (x), (and τi(x) is monotone decreasing) then, τi(x) is increased
by all independent zero-mean (unfair) background risks, i = 1, ..., 5.
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Proof: See Appendix D.
The above theorem gives a univariate sufficient condition for each type
of DRV, which is similar in spirit to the univariate sufficient condition for
risk vulnerability in Proposition 3 of Gollier and Pratt (1996). We attribute
the third part (i = 3) of the above theorem and Corollary 1 below to Lajeri-
Chaherli (2004) who uses these two results to characterize precautionary
vulnerability in the context of precautionary savings.
As an immediate consequence of the above theorem, we have the follow-
ing corollary.
Corollary 1 For i = 1, assume C(x) ≥ −0.5. If τi(x) is decreasing and
convex then it is increased by all independent unfair background risks, i =
1, ..., 5.
We attribute the result where i = 1 to Hara et al. (2011) who show that
if cautiousness is positive, decreasing, and convex, then it is increased by all
unfair background risks. Here we have relaxed the requirement of positive
cautiousness to the condition that C(x) ≥ −0.5. As we mentioned earlier
the third part of the result (i = 3) is due to Lajeri-Chaherli (2004).
The condition of decreasing and convex DRA measures appears quite
reasonable as we show in the next subsection that most familiar HARA
utility functions satisfy this condition.
2.4 The Case of HARA Utility Functions
The case of HARA utility functions deserves some special attention as they
are most frequently used in economics and finance. Some simple calculations
show that for all HARA utility functions with a marginal utility function
u′(x) = (x + a)−γ , where γ > 0, R(x), D(x), P (x), and −R′(x) are all
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decreasing and convex, and C(x) ≡ C = 1γ is constant; thus all these HARA
utility functions satisfy the sufficient conditions for the first four types of
DRV in Corollary 1.
The Schwarzian derivative, however, is an exception. For these HARA
utility functions, we have R(x) = γx+a and S(x) = −R






2(x+a)2 . It follows that S(x) is decreasing and convex if
and only if γ ∈ (0, 2), i.e., its cautiousness C > 0.5. Thus these HARA
utility functions satisfy the sufficient condition for type 5 DRV in Corollary
1 only if C ≥ 0.5.
In fact, when C < 0.5, i.e., γ > 2, we have S ′(x) > 0, which violates the
necessary condition for type 5 DRV to unfair risks. Thus when C < 0.5, the
HARA utility functions do not have type 5 DRV to unfair risks. Moreover,
we can verify that when C < 0.5, the necessary and sufficient condition for
type 5 DRV to zero-mean risks in Theorem 1 is violated, thus these HARA
utility functions do not have type 5 DRV to zero-mean risks either.7
2.5 Behavioral Implications
In this subsection, we explain behavioral implications of the five types of
DRV. We first present the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Given two CDFs F (x) and G(x) whose supports are both con-
tained in [a, b], assume that G−1(F (x)) is concave and that u(x) is indifferent









u′2(x) , η3(x) =
R(x)
u′(x) , η4(x) = 1, and η5(x) = u
′(x),
then, F (x) is preferred to G(x) by any agent v(x) who has a greater DRA
measure of the ith type than u(x), i = 1, ..., 5.
7The verification is omitted for brevity but is available on request.
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The lemma is part of Theorem 2 in Huang (2012), and its proof can be found
there.
As is explained by Chiu (2005) and Huang (2012), according to Van
Zwet (1964), a convex (concave) transformation of a random variable re-
sults in a strong increase (decrease) in skewness. This implies that the set
of risk changes which satisfy the conditions (i) G−1(F (x)) is concave, (ii)






F (z))dzdx = 0 is a set of strong decreases in skewness. Thus the above
lemma shows that the five sets of strong skewness decreases are indifferent
for u(x) but are unfavored by those who have a greater DRA measure of the
ith type, i = 1, ..., 5, respectively.
This result also gives a glimpse into the relationship between the five
DRA measures: they all explain the intensity of an agent’s preference for
strong increases in skewness, but the sets of strong increases in skewness
over which the intensity of preference they explain are different from each
other.
As an immediate consequence of the above lemma, we have the following
result.
Proposition 1 Let i ∈ {1, ..., 5}. Given two CDFs F (x) and G(x) whose
supports are both contained in [a, b], assume that G−1(F (x)) is concave, an






F (z))dzdx = 0, where ηi(x) is defined in Lemma 1. If the agent has type i
DRV, in the presence of an independent unfair background risk, he prefers
F (x) to G(x).
This result shows that if an agent has type i DRV, the five sets of strong
skewness decreases which are indifferent for him become unfavored by him
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after an independent unfair background risk is added to his wealth. In other
words, if he has type i DRV, an independent unfair background risk will
increase the intensity of his preference for skewness.
3 Higher Order Risk Vulnerability
3.1 The Definition
As we explained in the introduction section, we have higher order risk aver-
sion measures Rn/m(x) = (−1)
n−mu(n)(x)/u(m)(x), where 1 ≤ m < n. In
this section, we assume that (−1)iu(i)(x) < 0, i = 1, ..., n.8 We now give the
following definition.
Definition 2 An agent is said to have (n/m)th order risk vulnerability
if any independent unfair background risk ˜ makes him behave in a more
(n/m)th order risk-averse way, i.e., Rn/m(x) is increased by ˜.
The above definition nests risk vulnerability as a special case where n =
2, m = 1. Also, the second and third notions of downside risk vulnerability
discussed earlier are special cases of (n/m)th order risk vulnerability where
n = 3, m = 1 and n = 3, m = 2 respectively.
3.2 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
We present the following result:
Theorem 5 The following statements are true.
8If a utility function exhibits nth order strictly risk aversion for every n, it is said to
have mixed risk aversion by Caballe and Pomansky (1996). They point out that most
utility functions used in examples have mixed risk aversion.
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1. An agent u(x) is (n/m)th order risk vulnerable if and only if Rn/m(x)
is decreasing and (−1)m−1ξ(w, x) ≥ 0 for all w and x, where ξ(w, x)
is defined by
ξ(w, x) = u(m)(x)(Rn/m(x)− Rn/m(w))− u
(m)(w)R′n/m(w)(x−w).
2. An agent u(x) is (n/m)th order risk vulnerable only if Rn/m(x) is
decreasing and R′′n/m(x) ≥ 2R
′
n/m(x)R(m+1)/m(x) for every x.
3. An agent u(x) is (n/m)th order risk vulnerable if Rn/m(x) is decreasing
and R′′n/m(x) ≥ R
′
n/m(x)R(m+1)/m(x) for every x.
4. An agent u(x) is ((n+1)/n)th order risk vulnerable if both R(n+1)/n(x)
and R(n+2)/(n+1)(x) are decreasing.
Proof: see Appendix E
The above result gives a bivariate necessary and sufficient condition, a
univariate necessary condition, and a univariate sufficient condition for the
(n/m)th order risk vulnerability. When n = 2, m = 1, from the three state-
ments in the above result we obtain Gollier and Pratt’s (1996) Proposition
2, the condition (13), and Proposition 3, respectively.
It is not difficult to verify that any HARA class utility function with
a marginal utility function (x + a)−γ , where γ > 0, has decreasing and
convex (n/m)th order risk aversion, which implies that it satisfies the third
condition in the above theorem; thus all such HARA utility functions have
(n/m)th order risk vulnerability.
3.3 Behavioral Implications
There are alternative ways to give behavioral implications of higher order
risk vulnerabilities: For example, we may use the results on Rn/(n−1)(x) in
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Denuit and Eeckhoudt’s (2010a) and Jindapon and Neilson (2007) to give
two behavioral implications of the (n/(n−1))th order risk vulnerability. We
may also use Denuit and Eeckhoudt’s (2010b) result on (−1)n−1u(n)(x)/u(1)(x)
to give a behavioral implication of the (n/1)th order risk vulnerability.
It is also possible to give behavioral interpretations using Eeckhoudt et
al.’s (2009) concept of risk apportionment via stochastic dominance, how-
ever, in the following discussion, for convenience we use Liu and Meyer’s
(2013) result onRn/m(x) to explain the behavioral implications of the (n/m)th
order risk vulnerability. Let F (x) and G(x) be two CDFs on [a, b]. Let
F1(x) = F (x) and Fi(x) =
∫ x
a Fi−1(y)dy. According to Ekern’s (1980) def-
inition, G(x) is said to have more nth degree risk on [a, b] than F (x) if
Gi(b) = Fi(b), i = 1, ..., n, and ∀x ∈ [a, b], Gn(x) ≥ Fn(x).
As before, given an independent background risk ˜, we use uˆ(x) to denote
Eu(x+ ˜). Also, let Rˆn/m(x) denote (−1)
n−muˆ(n)(x)/uˆ(m)(x). We have the
following result.
Proposition 2 Assume u(x) has the (n/m)th order risk vulnerability. Given
an independent unfair background risk ˜, if Rˆn/m(x) 6= Rn/m(x) then there
exists δ > 0, such that
∫ x+δ




x−δ ud(F −G)∫ x+δ
x−δ ud(F −H)
for all F (y), G(y), and H(y) on [x− δ, x+ δ] such that G(y) has more nth
degree risk than F (y) and H(y) has more mth degree risk than F (y).
Proof: As u(x) has the (n/m)th order risk vulnerability, if Rˆn/m(x) 6=
Rn/m(x) then Rˆn/m(x) > Rn/m(x). Then the result immediately follows
from Liu and Meyer’s (2013) Theorem 3.9 Q.E.D.
9Liu and Meyer’s (2013) Theorem 3 states that if u(x) has strictly greater (n/m)th or-
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Using Liu and Meyer’s (2013) explanation, Rˆn/m(x) > Rn/m(x) implies
that, in the presence of an independent unfair background risk ˜, “...re-
stricted to a sufficiently small neighborhood about x, agent u is willing to
pay more in terms of an mth degree risk increase to avoid any nth-degree
risk increase than is agent v.”
4 An Application to Precautionary Savings
In this section we give an example of applications of the results in this paper
to economic problems. Start with a two-period consumption-saving model
which is widely used in the literature. Consider an agent whose first-period
and second-period utility functions are u and v respectively. Assume that u
and v are both strictly increasing and strictly concave. Also assume that u is
continuously differentiable and v is (n+1) times continuously differentiable.
With wealth w and a risk x˜, which has a CDF F (x) defined on a real interval
[a, b], he has the following maximization problem:
max
s
U(s;F ) = u(w− s) +
∫ b
a
v(s+ x)dF (x), (11)
where s is his saving for the second period.
Suppose that just before he finalizes his consumption-saving plan, he
made a financial or non-financial deal which results in some certain change
in his wealth and an additional unfair risk ˜ independent from the original
risk x˜. With this change, his consumption-saving problem becomes:
max
s
Uˆ(s;F ) = u(wˆ− s) +
∫ b
a
E˜v(s+ ˜+ x)dF (x), (12)













vd(F −H) for all F (y), G(y), and H(y) on [x− δ, x+ δ] such
that G(y) and H(y) have more nth and mth degree risk than F (y) respectively.
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where wˆ is his certain amount of wealth after the deal. Suppose that the deal
is carefully considered such that it does not affect his optimal consumption-
saving plan, i.e., the above two problems have the same optimal solution
s∗.
4.1 Mean-Utility-Preserving Risk Increases
Now consider the class of changes in the agent’s original risk x˜ which are
called mean-utility-preserving risk increases for utility function −v′ with
wealth s∗ defined by Diamond and Stiglitz (1974).10 In this case, since
such risk increases do not change the expectation of v′(s∗ + x˜), they do
not change the optimal solution to the agent’s consumption-saving problem
(11). However, what is the effect of such risk increases on problem (12)?
Let Pv and Tv denote the absolute prudence and temperance of v.
11
Assume that Pv is decreasing and either Tv is decreasing or Pv ≥ P
′
vPv .
Then according to Theorem 5, the absolute risk aversion of −v′, which is
equal to the absolute prudence of v, is increased by the unfair risk ˜. In this
case, it is well known −Ex˜E˜v
′(s∗ + ˜+ x˜) is reduced by such mean-utility-
preserving risk increases.12 It follows that Uˆ ′(s∗;G) ≥ Uˆ ′(s∗;F ), which
implies an increase in the optimal saving. Hence, while these risk changes
do not affect the optimal saving in problem (11), they raise the optimal
saving in problem (12).
10According to Diamond and Stiglitz (1974), a change in risk F (x)→ G(x) on [a, b] is a







u′(w0 + x)F (x)dx, ∀x ∈ [a, b], with the equality holding at y = b.
11The absolute temperance is defined by Eeckhoudt et al. (1996) and Gollier and Pratt
(1996) as −v′′′′/v′′′.
12See, for example, Theorem 3 in Diamond and Stiglitz (1974).
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4.2 Mean-Utility-Preserving Higher Degree Risk Increases
We first present the following definition of mean-utility-preserving nth de-
gree risk increases given by Denuit and Eeckhoudt (2010a):
Definition 3 Assume that u is (n−1)th degree risk averse, i.e., (−1)nu(n−1)
> 0. A risk change F (x) → G(x) on [a, b] is said to be a mean-utility-
preserving nth degree risk increases for u with wealth w0 if it preserves the
first n − 2 moments and the mean utility and satisfies the condition that
Gn(b) < Fn(b) and there exists z such that Gn(x) ≥ Fn(x), ∀x ≤ z and
Gn−1(x) ≤ Fn−1(x), ∀x ≥ z.
Consider the class of mean-utility-preserving nth degree increase in risk
for −v′ with wealth s∗. In this case, since such risk increases do not change
the expectation of v′(s∗ + x˜), they do not change the optimal solution to
the agent’s consumption-saving problem (11). However, what is the effect
of such risk increases on problem (12)?
Let Rv(n+1)/n denote the ((n + 1)/n)th order absolute risk aversion of
v, i.e., Rv(n+1)/n = −
v(n+1)
v(n)
. Assume that Rv(n+1)/n is decreasing and either







to Theorem 5, any unfair risk ˜ raises the ((n+ 1)/n)th order absolute risk
aversion of v.
According to the Proposition 1 in Denuit and Eeckhoudt (2010a), since
−vˆ′(x) = −E˜v
′(x+ ˜) has greater nth order absolute risk aversion than −v′,
the above class of risk increases will reduce −Ex˜E˜v
′(s∗ + ˜+ x˜). It follows
that Uˆ ′(s) is increased by these risk increases, which implies an increase in
the optimal saving. Hence, while these mean-utility-preserving nth degree
risk increases do not affect the optimal saving in problem (11), they raise
the optimal saving in problem (12).
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we have added an independent unfair background risk to the
higher order risk-taking models in the literature and examined its interaction
with the main risk under consideration. An agent is said to have a higher
order risk vulnerability if adding an independent unfair background risk to
wealth raises his level of a higher order risk-aversion. We have presented
analytical necessary and sufficient conditions for this concept.
Compared with risk vulnerability, the case of higher order risk vulnera-
bility is more complex. For example, in the case of the third order, corre-
sponding to the five definitions of DRA measures respectively, there are five
types of third order risk vulnerabilities or DRVs, while in the case of the nth
(n > 3) order, there are (n − 1) types of risk vulnerabilities corresponding
to the (n/1)th, (n/2)th, ..., and (n/(n − 1))th orders of Arrow-Pratt risk
aversion measure respectively. We have given a detailed analysis for each
type of the third and higher order risk vulnerabilities.
As in the case of risk vulnerability, all familiar DARA utility functions —
in fact, all HARA (CARA, CRRA,...) functions — have all types of higher
order risk vulnerability except for the type of DRV corresponding to the
Schwarzian derivative. These HARA utility functions will have this type of
DRV if and only if we additionally require that cautiousness is larger than
0.5.
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Appendix A Proof of Theorem 1
To prove the theorem, we need the following lemma. Let Ω0 be the set of all
zero-mean binary random variables. Let Ω be any set of zero-mean random
variables which contains Ω0. Let f(x), g(x), and h(x) be three functions
such that ∀ ˜ ∈ Ω, Ef(˜) ≥ 0, Eg(˜) ≥ 0, and Eh(˜) ≥ 0.
Lemma 2 ∀ ˜ ∈ Ω, Eg(˜)Eh(˜) ≥ [Ef(˜)]2 if and only if the inequality is
true for all ˜ ∈ Ω0.
Proof: We first prove the following statement: ∀ ˜ ∈ Ω, Eg(˜)Eh(˜) ≥
[Ef(˜)]2, if and only if ∀ ˜1 ∈ Ω and ∀ ˜2 ∈ Ω, Eg(˜1)Eh(˜2)+Eg(˜2)Eh(˜1) ≥
2Ef(˜1)Ef(˜2). This is proved as follows. To prove the “if” part, we let
˜1 = ˜2 in the latter inequality, while to prove the “only if” part, we need
only note that
Eg(˜1)Eh(˜2) + Eg(˜2)Eh(˜1) ≥ 2
√
Eg(˜1)Eh(˜1)Eh(˜2)Eg(˜2).
On the other hand, if we fix either of the two random variables, the ex-
pression Eg(˜1)Eh(˜2)+Eg(˜2)Eh(˜1)−2Ef(˜1)Ef(˜2) is linear in the distri-
bution of the other (in the probabilities of its possible values). This implies
that ∀ ˜1 ∈ Ω and ∀ ˜2 ∈ Ω, Eg(˜1)Eh(˜2)+Eg(˜2)Eh(˜1) ≥ 2Ef(˜1)Ef(˜2)
if and only if ∀ ˜1 ∈ Ω0 and ∀ ˜2 ∈ Ω0, the inequality is true. Now applying
the preceding statement for the case where Ω = Ω0, we immediately obtain
the lemma. Q.E.D.
With the help of Lemma 2, we are now ready to prove the theorem.
The result where i = 2 and 3 is a special case of Statement 1 of Theorem 5
which is proved in the last appendix, thus we need only prove the result for
the other three cases. Note that as an unfair risk can be decomposed into
a certain reduction in wealth and a zero-mean risk, a necessary [sufficient]
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condition for all independent zero-mean background risks to increase τi(x)
combined with the condition that τi(x) is monotone decreasing is a nec-
essary [sufficient] condition for all independent unfair background risks to
increase τi(x). Thus we need only prove the result for the case of zero-mean
background risks.
To prove the result for τ1(x) = C(x), note that the inequality Cˆ(x) ≥
C(x) is equivalent to
u′(x)u′′′(x)
u′′2(x)
[Eu′′(x+ ˜)]2 ≤ Eu′(x+ ˜)Eu′′′(x+ ˜). (13)





[Eu′′(x+ ˜)]2 ≤ Eu′(x+ ˜)Eu′′′(x+ ˜).
It is straightforward to see that Lemma 2 is applicable to this case. From
this lemma it is clear that the inequality Cˆ(x) ≥ C(x) is true for all zero-
mean risks if and only if it is true for all zero-mean binary risks, which is
equivalent to Inequality (1) as C(x) = ( 1R(x))
′. This proves the result for
τ1(x).
To prove the result for τ4(x) = −R
′(x), we have
−Rˆ′(x) =
Eu′′′(x+ ˜)Eu′(x+ ˜)− [Eu′′(x+ ˜)]2
[Eu′(x+ ˜)]2
.
Thus the inequality −Rˆ′(x) ≥ −R′(x) is equivalent to
E[u′′′(x+ ˜) + R′(x)u′(x+ ˜)]Eu′(x+ ˜) ≥ [Eu′′(x+ ˜)]2.
It follows that the problem is to characterize the utility function u(x)
which satisfies the following condition
E˜ = 0⇒ [Eu′′(x+ ˜)]2 ≤ E[u′′′(x+ ˜) +R′(x)u′(x+ ˜)]Eu′(x+ ˜).
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If for some zero-mean ˜, E[u′′′(x + ˜) + R′(x)u′(x + ˜)] < 0, then there
must exist a zero-mean binary ˜ such that E[u′′′(x+ ˜)+R′(x)u′(x+ ˜)] < 0.
Thus we need only consider the case where for all zero-mean risks, E[u′′′(x+
˜) + R′(x)u′(x + ˜)] ≥ 0. Now Lemma 2 is applicable to this case, and the
inequality −Rˆ′(x) ≥ −R′(x) is true for all zero-mean risks if and only if it
is true for all binary zero-mean risks, which is equivalent to Inequality (4).
This proves the result for τ4(x).











Thus the inequality Sˆ(x) ≥ S(x) is equivalent to




It follows that the problem is to characterize the utility function u(x) which




[Eu′′(x+ ˜)]2 ≤ E[u′′′(x+ ˜)− S(x)u′(x+ ˜)]Eu′(x+ ˜).
Similar to the case of τ4(x), we need only consider the case where for all
zero-mean risks, E[u′′′(x + ˜) − S(x)u′(x + ˜)] ≥ 0. Again, Lemma 2 is
applicable to this case, and Inequality (14) is true for all zero-mean risks
if and only if it is true for all binary zero-mean risks, which is equivalent
to Inequality (5) as S(x) = −R′(x) − 0.5R2(x). This proves the result for
τ5(x). Q.E.D.
Appendix B Proof of Theorem 2
As was explained at the beginning of the proof of Theorem 1, we need only
prove the result for the case of zero-mean background risks. The result
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where i = 1 follows from Theorem 1 in Hara et al. (2011), and its proof can
be found there. The result where i = 2 and 3 is a special case of Statement 2
of Theorem 5 which is proved in the last appendix, thus we need only prove
the result for the other two cases.















′ = 0, we have E[( u
′
Eu′ )
′R] = E[( u
′
Eu′ )














This and Equation (15) lead to
−Rˆ′(x)Eu′ = −E(u′R′) + E[u′(Rˆ(x)− R)2]. (17)
Adding R′(x)Eu′ to both sides, we obtain
(−Rˆ′(x) +R′(x))Eu′ = R′(x)Eu′−E(u′R′) + E[u′(Rˆ(x)− R)2]. (18)
Meanwhile, we have (Eu′)2E(u′(Rˆ(x)−R)2) = E[u′(−Eu′′−REu′)2] =
E[u′(R′(x)u′(x)+O(2))2] = R′2(x)u′3(x)σ2 +O(σ
3
 ). This implies that




R′(x)Eu′− E(u′R′) = 0.5[R′(x)u′′′(x)− (u′(x)R′(x))′′]σ2 +O(σ
3
 ).
13For brevity, in the rest of the proof, we omit the argument (x + ˜) of the functions
under the expectation operator.
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The last two equation, together with Equation (18), imply that (−Rˆ′(x) +
R′(x))Eu′ is equal to




Thus for arbitrarily small σ, −Rˆ
′(x) ≥ −R′(x) only if R′(x)u′′′(x) + 2u′(x)
R′2(x)− (u′(x)R′(x))′′ ≥ 0, which is equivalent to −R′′′(x) + 2R(x)R′′(x) +
2R′2(x) ≥ 0.
To prove the result where i = 5, we have







where again for brevity, we have omitted the argument (x+˜) of the functions















In the meantime, from Equation (16), we have −E[( u
′
Eu′ )
′R] = E[ u
′
Eu′ (Rˆ(x)−
R)2], while E( u
′
Eu′R
2) − (E u
′
Eu′R)
2 = E[ u
′
Eu′ (Rˆ(x) − R)
2]. Hence from the






















 ), and Equation (19), it follows that (Sˆ(x)− S(x))Eu








Thus for arbitrarily small σ, Sˆ(x) ≥ S(x), only if−S(x)u
′′′(x)+(u′(x)S(x))′′
+3u′(x)R′2(x) ≥ 0. As S(x) = −R′(x) − 0.5R2(x), it can be rewrit-
ten as S(x)(u′(x)R(x))′ − (u′(x)R(x)S(x))′ + (u′(x)S ′(x))′ + 3u′(x)(S(x)
+0.5R2(x))2 ≥ 0. Simplifying it, we obtain −2R(x)S ′(x)+S ′′(x)+3(S(x)+
0.5R2(x))2 ≥ 0. Q.E.D.
Appendix C Proof of Theorem 3
The result where i = 2 and 3 is a special case of Statement 1 of Theorem
5 which is proved in the last appendix, thus we need only prove the result
for the other three cases. As was explained at the beginning of the proof
of Theorem 1 in Appendix A, we need only prove the result for the case of
zero-mean risks. We first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3 For i ∈ {1, 4, 5}, τi(x) is increased by a zero-mean background
risk ˜ if
E(τi(x+ ˜)hi(x+ ˜)) ≥ τi(x)Ehi(x+ ˜), (21)
where hi(x) is defined in Theorem 3.
Proof: The results where i = 4 and 5 immediately follow from Equations
(17) and (20), respectively, thus we need only prove the case where i = 1.
To prove this case, we have




Some simple calculations lead to
Cˆ(x) + 1 =
Eu′(x+ ˜)
(Eu′′(x+ ˜))2























This, together with Equation (22), implies that






















We now use the lemma to prove the theorem. Applying the lemma, we
need only prove that the inequality in Theorem 3 is necessary and sufficient
for Inequality (21). This is shown as follows. It is well known that Inequality
(21) is true for all zero-mean ˜ if and only if it is true for all zero-mean binary
˜, i.e., pτi(x+ 1)hi(x+ 1)+ (1−p)τi(x+ 2)hi(x+ 2) ≥ τi(x)[phi(x+ 1)+
(1− p)hi(x+ 2)], for all p ∈ (0, 1), 1 and 2 satisfying p1 + (1− p)2 = 0.
After the elimination of p, this is equivalent to the condition that there exists








for any 1 > 0 > 2. By symmetry, the only candidate form(x) is hi(x)τ
′
i(x).
The above condition is thus equivalent to hi(y)(τi(y)−τi(x))−hi(x)τ
′
i(x)(y−
x) ≥ 0. Q.E.D.
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Appendix D Proof of Theorem 4
As was explained at the beginning of the proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix
A, we need only prove the result for the case of zero-mean risks. We first
prove the following lemma. The proof uses a technique that is very close to
the one used by Gollier and Pratt (1996) in the proof of their Proposition
3.
Lemma 4 Assume that for a given w, g(w) > 0, and for all x, f(x) > 0,
f ′(x) ≤ 0, and ( g(x)f(x))
′ ≤ 0. If for all x, ( g(x)f(x))
′′ ≥ −( g(x)f(x))
′ f
′(x)
f(x) then, for any
unfair ˜, Eg(w+˜)Ef(w+˜) ≥
g(w)
f(w) .
Proof: Note that as for all x, f(x) > 0 and ( g(x)f(x))



















f(x) is increasing. Thus as g(w) > 0 and for all x, f
′(x) ≤ 0, g(x)f(x)
is decreasing, and g′(x)− g(x)f
′(x)
































































As f(w) and g(w) are both strictly positive and g(w)f(w) is decreasing, the right





We now use the lemma to prove Theorem 4. Let f(x) = hi(x) and
g(x) = (τi(x)+α0)hi(x), where hi(x) is defined in Theorem 3 and α0 > 0 is
arbitrarily large. Note that for i = 1, ..., 5, for all x, f(x) = hi(x) > 0, and
for any given w, as α0 > 0 is arbitrarily large, g(w) = (τi(w)+α0)hi(w) > 0.
Also note that for i = 1, C(x) ≥ −0.5 implies h′1(x) = −h1(x)R(x)(2C(x)+
1) ≤ 0, for i = 3, h′i(x) = −u
′′′(x) ≤ 0, and for i = 2, 4, 5, h′i(x) =
u′′(x) ≤ 0. Moreover, as τi(x) is decreasing,
g(x)
f(x) = τi(x) + α0 is also
decreasing. Furthermore, we have−(lnhi(x))
′ = ζi(x), where ζi(x) is defined









i(x)ζi(x) ≥ 0. Thus f(x) and g(x) satisfy all
the conditions in the lemma. Now applying the lemma, we obtain Eg(w+˜)Ef(w+˜) ≥
g(w)
f(w) ∀˜. This implies that ∀˜,
E[(τi(w+˜)+α0)hi(w+˜)]
Ehi(w+˜)
≥ (τi(w)+α0)hi(w)hi(w) , i.e.,
E[τi(w + ˜)hi(w + ˜)] ≥ τi(w)Ehi(w + ˜). Applying Lemma 3 of the last
appendix, we immediately obtain the conclusion in the theorem. Q.E.D.
Appendix E Proof of Theorem 5
As was explained at the beginning of the proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix A,
we need only prove the result for the case of zero-mean risks. We first prove
Statement 1. The inequality (−1)n−m Eu
(n)(x+˜)
Eu(m)(x+˜)
≥ Rn/m(x) is equivalent to
(−1)n−1Eu(n)(x+ ˜) ≥ (−1)m−1Rn/m(x)Eu
(m)(x+ ˜).
It is well known that the above inequality is true for all zero-mean ˜ if and
only if it is true for all zero-mean binary ˜.14 Thus the inequality is true for
14See, for example, Gollier and Pratt’s (1996) argument in the proof of their Proposition
2.
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(m)(x2)](x1 − x) ≥ 0.









The only candidate for κ(x) is u(m)(x)R′n/m(x), and it follows that the
above condition is equivalent to (−1)m−1ξ(w, x) ≥ 0, where ξ(w, x) =
u(m)(x)(Rn/m(x) − Rn/m(w)) − u
(m)(w)R′n/m(w)(x − w). This proves the
first statement.






which implies ∂ξ(w,x)∂x |x=w = 0. It follows that to have (−1)
m−1ξ(w, x) ≥ 0
∀w, x, it is necessary that (−1)m−1
∂2ξ(w,x)
∂x2 |x=w ≥ 0 ∀w, which is equivalent
to R′′n/m(w) ≥ 2R(m+1)/m(w)R
′
n/m(w) ∀w.
To prove the third statement, let f(x) = (−1)m−1u(m)(x) and g(x) =
(−1)n−1u(n)(x). Applying Lemma 4 in the last appendix, we immediately
conclude that the third statement is true.
The proof of the fourth statement follows from the proof of Proposition
1 in Kimball (1993) and from the fact that R(n+1)/n is isomorphic to risk
aversion as applied to (−1)n−1u(n−1). Q.E.D.
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